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Local governments’ incentives and governing practices in low-carbon transition: 
A comparative study of solar water heater governance in four Chinese cities 
                             
Abstract 
Urban sustainability transitions have been increasingly imperative to address global 
environmental challenges, and local governments are expected to play a critical role. There is 
a pressing need to explore local governments’ underlying motivations and their impacts on 
governing practices. Taking China as an example, this paper builds an incentive matrix to 
distinguish the levels of local governments’ economic interest and environmental interest in 
specific low-carbon innovations and investigates how different incentive typologies affect their 
governing practices. By comparing four Chinese municipal governments’ incentives and 
governing practices in promoting solar water heater adoption, this paper finds that Chinese local 
governments’ environmental incentive is still not compelling or stable enough, while 
governments that are motivated by economic interests would resort to more substantial 
governance practices to promote the low-carbon innovations. These results indicate potential 
in latecomer cities in developing both economic and environmental incentives towards low-
carbon innovations because green activities could also be favored if they are well aligned with 
local economic development. 
 
Keywords: local government, urban transition, incentive matrix, governing modes, China.   
 
1 Introduction  
Urban sustainability transitions have been increasingly imperative to address global 
environmental challenges (Bulkeley, Broto, Hodson, & Marvin, 2013). The core inquiry 
of sustainability transition research is how environmental innovations take place and 
what factors facilitate or impede them to gain momentum in niches, and to adapt, grow 
and become mainstream in various geographical contexts (STRN, 2010). Low-carbon 
innovations are attractive on the collective environmental criteria but are usually 
inferior to their substitutes in terms of cost performance. Besides, pricing and subsidy 
often favor existing approaches, and there are often enormous upfront costs of 
investment. Consequently, private sectors have little incentive to develop low-carbon 
innovations, and state intervention is believed to be essential (Horbach, 2016; Rennings, 
2000).  
 
The rise of the so-called low-carbon urbanism responds to the pressing need for local 
governments to align environmental objectives and local economic development 
(Bulkeley et al., 2016). A variety of governance initiatives for low-carbon urbanism 
have proliferated in the world. Prominent examples are the “Transition Towns 
Movement” originated from UK (Connors and McDonald, 2010) and the “Low Carbon 
City Initiative” in China (Yu, 2014; Liu and Qin, 2016). Local governments resort to 
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different governing strategies in advancing low-carbon urbanism (Lo, 2014). Bulkeley 
and Kern (2006) identify four governing modes of local governments in low-carbon 
transitions, namely, self-governing, governing by authority, governing by provision, 
and governing by enabling. These modes are not exclusive to each other, and in many 
cases, they are used together to deal with specific issues. The difference lies in the 
priority assigned to these modes of governing in different places. For instance, Bulkeley 
and Kern (2006) find that the local governing related to climate protection in the UK 
and Germany is mainly through self-governing and governing by enabling, such as 
reducing energy consumption in municipal buildings and promoting awareness about 
the energy use and its impacts. Mans and Meerow (2012) compare the governance of 
renewable energy clusters in five different cities worldwide (Baoding, Calgary, 
Hamburg, Piracicaba, San Diego) and find that while governing through enabling is the 
most commonly used mode in western countries, governing by authority is the most 
prominent in China’s practice. It is not uncommon to see governments resort to these 
governing modes in promoting low-carbon innovations, but there exist vast differences 
in the performance of each governing mode, which we believe has much to do with 
local governments’ incentives towards the specific innovations.  
 
Previous research has provided mounting evidence of how local governments support 
low-carbon innovations (e.g., Mans & Meerow, 2012; Cowell et al., 2016), but there is 
so far very limited knowledge about why governments in different places show different 
levels of commitment to comprehensive governance approaches (Lee & Painter, 2015). 
It is problematic to simply compare local governments’ governing practices without 
understanding their interests towards particular low-carbon innovations. Low-carbon 
technologies not only differ in their modes of innovation (e.g., based on codified 
knowledge or experience) and valuation (e.g., customized market or standardized 
market) (Binz, Gosens, Hansen, & Hansen, 2017), but also vary in what and how much 
benefit they could bring to a place. Depending on the characteristics of the focal low-
carbon innovations and territorial priorities, local governments may exhibit very 
different interests and thus adopt distinct governing strategies.  
 
Therefore, this paper aims to explore whether and why local governments show 
different interests in particular low-carbon innovations and how these differences affect 
their governing practices. Local governments’ incentives are deeply structured by a 
country’s political set-up, especially the relationship between local governments and 
the central government (Zhuravskaya, 2000). Taking China as an example, local 
government as a whole aims to increase the economic, social and environmental well-
being of the society, but it is also an organization run by rational officials pursuing 
personal political achievements (Chen, Lin, & Xue, 2010). This paper builds a 
technology-specific incentive matrix to differentiate local governments’ economic 
interest and environmental interest in low-carbon innovations and investigates their 
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impact on local governments’ governing approaches in China’s context. To illustrate 
this framework, we compare four Chinese municipal governments’ motivations and 
governing practices in promoting solar water heater (SWH) adoption.  
 
China has committed to the development of renewable energy since the beginning of 
the 21st century. In 2005, China’s National People’s Congress passed the Renewable 
Energy Law, highlighting the strategic significance of renewable energy in meeting 
China’s sustainable development target and energy demand. Based on this law, 
subsequent plans, policies, and regulations at both the national level and local level 
were issued to encourage renewable energy development. At the Copenhagen Climate 
Change Conference in 2009, China’s then-Premier Wen Jiabao pledged to reduce 
carbon intensity by 40-45% by 2020 and to increase the share of non-fossil energy in 
primary energy consumption to 15% by 2020. Besides, environmental criteria are 
gaining more weight in the evaluation of local governments’ performance. Through 
these efforts, energy-saving and emission reduction (‘jie neng jian pai’) has become a 
widely accepted political discourse across different levels of governments. 
 
So far, China has been the leading country in the production and consumption of SWH 
(Weiss, Spörk-Dür, & Mauthner, 2017). Compared to other low-carbon technologies 
such as solar PV, the role of solar thermal heating in low-carbon transitions has long 
been neglected. In fact, globally, solar thermal heating yields much more green energy 
than solar PV (Weiss, Spörk-Dür, & Mauthner, 2017). Nevertheless, SWH suffers from 
the image as a low-end, low-tech, unreliable technology in many places (Yu & Gibbs, 
2018a). Although the initial development of China’s SWH industry was basically 
market-driven, recent years have seen growing governmental interests in this 
technology. SWH is rediscovered as an environmental product, and policy interventions 
at various governance levels have been initiated to promote its diffusion. While national 
and provincial governments play a significant role in the formulation of orientative 
policies, urban governments are primarily responsible for the translation of higher-level 
strategies and for delivering SWH adoption on the ground. It is observed that governing 
approaches of local governments vary and have reached very different outcomes among 
Chinese cities. Therefore, it would be intriguing to probe the governing dynamics 
behind the implementation of SWH in urban China.   
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the incentive matrix to 
differentiate local governments’ interests towards specific low-carbon innovations in 
China’s context and develops a framework to analyze the relationship between the 
government’s interests and governing practices. Section 3 describes the method and the 
four case cities. Section 4 presents the four municipal governments’ interests towards 
SWH and their governing modes. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 
concludes the paper with implications for policy-making and future research.  
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2 Local governments’ incentive typology on low-carbon 
innovations in China’s context   
2.1 Decentralisation, cadre performance evaluation, and incentives    
The commitments and autonomy of local governments in low-carbon transitions differ 
with different political systems. The different designs in power devolution or 
decentralization from central governments significantly affect local governments’ 
interests and capacities in governing environmental sustainability (Brown, Hart, Small, 
& de Oca Munguia, 2016; Cowell et al., 2016; Jiang, 2006; Pini, River, & McKenzie, 
2007). Accompanying China’s economic liberalization since the 1980s was the 
decentralization of political power from the central government to subnational 
governments. Provincial and urban level governments gradually gained more 
administrative autonomy and responsibility to govern the social-economic activities 
within their territories (Oi, 1992). Notably, China’s fiscal contracting reform caused a 
significant transformation in the relationship between the central government and local 
governments (Jin, Qian, & Weingast, 2005). The tax reform in 1994 devolved more 
administrative responsibility to local governments, but largely decreased their 
proportion in national tax revenue distribution. With the rise of administrative 
responsibility and the decrease in tax revenue from national distribution, local 
governments have developed an inherent interest in increasing their fiscal revenue by 
enlarging the local economic base. The economic decentralization in China, to a certain 
extent, has created a quasi-federal structure, providing local governments incentives 
and a roadmap for change (Thun, 2004).  
 
Despite the political devolution, the central government backed by the Chinese 
Communist Party is able to exert considerable influence over the governance at the 
subnational levels through the cadre performance evaluation system, in which higher-
level governments decide the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of local cadres 
(Tsui & Wang, 2008). Local governments’ interests are primarily determined by local 
political leadership (Hu & Hassink, 2017). Hence, China’s local governments are 
neither complete agents of public interests nor pure self-interested politicians, but rather 
a mix of the two roles (Zhao, Chen, & Xue, 2013). Zhou (2004) argues that economic 
interests are not so motivating as political interests among local governments, because 
economic performance is mainly a means to achieve political achievement. The central 
government steers local cadres towards its national agenda by setting explicit political 
performance targets in social and economic development. For a long time, economic 
growth has been a dominant indicator in deciding local officials’ political performance, 
hence, a GDP-oriented evaluation system. This incentive scheme stimulates China’s 
fast local economy development at the cost of environmental degradation because it 
provides little incentive to local governments for the full implementation of central 
government’s environmental policies, resulting in poor implementation or non-
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implementation (Ran, 2013).  
 
In recent years, environmental sustainability is becoming an important issue in 
international and national agendas. Both the central government and the public are 
placing increasing pressure on China’s urban leaders to address environmental 
problems such as air pollution (Zheng, Kahn, Sun, & Luo, 2014). Environment quality 
has also gained more weight in cadre performance, and it seems that a regime shift is 
taking place such that local political leaders are increasingly incentivized by 
environmental performance (ibid.). However, in many cases, the fulfillment of 
environmental targets is in conflict with the realization of economic goals. Therefore, 
“the political incentives are still not effective enough to encourage widespread 
implementation of environmental policies at local levels” (Ran, 2013: 26).  
 
2.2 An interest typology on low-carbon innovations 
Existing studies on local governments’ incentives have not differentiated the 
expectations towards different industries. Facing the emergence of low-carbon sectors 
in recent years, local governments have exhibited various interests (Chen et al., 2010). 
While the economy-environment tension has been a widespread concern, the idea of 
the green economy opens up the possibility of reaping both economic and 
environmental benefits (Gibbs, Jonas, & While, 2002). Through promoting 
environmental innovations, local governments facilitate the development of green 
industry, hence, obtaining the benefits in the forms of, e.g., employment and tax revenue. 
In terms of environmental benefits, the broad adoption of environmental innovations 
could help to relieve local ecological challenges. Low-carbon development also helps 
to earn a green image and to win more political credits and legitimacy from both higher-
level governments and the civil society. Therefore, specific to a particular low-carbon 
innovation, local governments can expect to gain either economic benefits or 
environmental benefits, or both. 
 
Concurring with Zhou (2004), we argue that political interest is the overarching 
incentive of local governments in China and performance in economic or environmental 
development mainly serves as a channel for them to achieve political interest. Subject 
to the focal low-carbon innovations and the local development priorities, local 
governments’ economic and environmental interests may differ significantly. 
Depending on the level of interest in economic and environmental dimensions, we 
identify four typologies of local governments’ interest combination in low-carbon 
innovations (Figure 1): a) economy-driven, when economic interest is strong and 
environmental interest is weak; b) environment-driven, when economic interest is weak 
and environmental interest is strong; c) economy-environment overlap, when both 
economic and environmental incentives are at the high level; and d) status quo, when 
 6 
there is a lack of both economic and environmental incentives to change the status quo.  
 
Figure 1. Typology of local governments’ interest in low-carbon innovations 
 
A local government’s interest combination in a specific low-carbon innovation may 
locate in one of the typologies, but it may also move to another quadrant overtime when 
the local development priorities have shifted. In many cases, environment improvement 
can also bring economic interest through, for instance, building a green image and 
attracting green investment. 
 
2.3 The role of interest typologies in the performance of low-carbon governance  
Different incentive typologies would affect local governments’ governing practices. In 
their study of China’s new energy automobile industry, Chen et al. (2010) find that 
when only motived by political (environmental) interest, local governments tend to 
adopt superficial industry strategies without genuine investment and strict 
implementation, while under strong economic incentives, local governments will take 
substantial actions in promoting the industry. However, there still lack studies 
specifying how incentive combination affects local governments’ choice and 
performance of governing approaches.    
 
The performance of low-carbon governance can be analyzed through the variety and 
intensity of different governing approaches. Bulkeley and Kern's (2006) 
conceptualization of the four governing modes can serve as an analytical framework 
for the elucidation of the performance of low-carbon governance. Self-governing is the 
approach that the local government governs its own activities, such as the procurement 
of green technologies. The government can invest in sustainable technologies and apply 
them in public facilities to induce a demonstration effect. In governing by authority, the 
government uses its authority over other actors to promote green standards through, 
e.g., planning and regulations. Governing by provision means providing particular 
forms of services and resources such as financial subsidy so that green investment could 
Economy-environment 
overlap  
Economy-driven  
Economic  
interest  
Environmental interest  
Environment-driven  Status quo 
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be encouraged. As to governing through enabling, the local government acts as the core 
actor in facilitating and coordinating the private-public partnership and community 
engagement to take green actions. In this scenario, persuasion, argument, and incentives 
are the primary means of action. In many cases, these governing modes are used jointly 
to deal with specific issues.  
 
Using governments’ incentive matrix of low-carbon innovations on the one hand, and 
Bulkeley and Kern’s (2006) framework of governing modes on the other, this study 
tries to not only differentiate local governments’ performance levels of governance but 
also investigate how different interest typologies define their governing strategies. Four 
cases of SWH adoption in urban China are presented as an illustration of this analytical 
framework.  
 
3 Methods  
3.1 Context  
The focal low-carbon innovation of this research is SWH. In 2015, the production and 
consumption of solar thermal energy in China respectively represented more than 80% 
and 67% of the world’s capacity (Weiss et al., 2017). China’s outstanding success in 
the solar thermal application is primarily rested on low-temperature SWH collectors, 
which are widely employed for hot water and heating. The most commonly used SWH 
collectors are the evacuated-tube collector and flat-plate collector. China’s SWH 
industry began from the 1980s and witnessed a dramatic growth since early 1990s when 
an indigenous breakthrough in evacuated-tube technology significantly reduced the 
cost and happened to meet the fast-growing demand for economic hot water during 
China’s unprecedented urbanization (Hu et al., 2012).  
 
After 2006, China’s Renewable Energy Law explicitly encouraged the adoption of 
SWH in the urban market, and many provincial and municipal governments initiated 
various measures to encourage SWH incorporation with urban buildings. These 
measures cover different policy fields, such as industrial policy for solar thermal 
industry and energy policy for renewable energy application, and encompass different 
instrument types (e.g., economic instruments and regulatory instruments) to fulfill 
purposes of technology push, demand pull and system building (Borrás and Edquist, 
2013). Government-subsidized demonstration projects for SWH application are typical 
examples of economic instruments. In terms of regulatory instruments, the most 
influential approach is the mandatory installation policy, which requires estate 
developers to incorporate SWHs into new residential buildings. Since then, the SWH-
incorporated building project market has grown rapidly, and the flat-plate SWH has 
gained increasing popularity as it enjoys many advantages in incorporation with high-
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rise buildings.  
3.2 Case cities  
Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics of the four case cities, Dezhou, Rizhao, 
Beijing, and Shenzhen. These cities are selected based on the following considerations. 
First, the four municipal governments have adopted strategies to facilitate SWH 
popularisation at a different time and reached very different outcomes. Second, the four 
cities have diversified motivations to support the SWH industry. It is particularly 
interesting to see how cities at different economic development stages demonstrate 
diverse interests in this low-tech green innovation. Dezhou and Rizhao are economic 
latecomers compared to Beijing and Shenzhen, but they have been the pioneers in SWH 
utilization in the urban market, both known as Solar City. Though the different diffusion 
outcomes have been previously explained from the infrastructure, user preference and 
industrial perspectives (Huang, Ma, & Liu, 2018; Li, Song, Beresford, & Ma, 2011; Yu 
& Gibbs, 2018a, 2018b), the incentives and governing practices of the local 
governments also significantly matter.  
 
Table 1. Key characteristics of the four case cities (2016) 
 Dezhou  Rizhao Beijing  Shenzhen 
Population (million)  5.63 3.00  21.73 11.91 
GDP per capita (thousand RMB) 57.9 62.36 114.7 167.4 
Urbanization rate (%) 53.8 56.9 86.5 100 
Share of tertiary industry in GDP (%) 42.1 44.6 80.2 60.1 
 
This research applied a qualitative investigation of local governments’ incentives and 
governing practices. The primary data was collected during fieldwork in the four cities, 
including 71 semi-structured interviews with government officials (9), firms (32), 
intermediary actors (12), and consumers (18), as well as secondary materials such as 
policy documents, industry reports, and news media coverage. Interviewees were asked 
about their knowledge of SWH implementation in the corresponding city. Sampling 
continued until new interviews did not provide additional information on the key topic 
concerning the approaches and performance of low-carbon governance.  
4 Results  
4.1 Dezhou  
4.1.1 Dezhou government’s interest towards SWH   
Located in west Shandong, Dezhou is a typical developing city in China. With fast 
industrialization since the 1980s, the manufacturing industry becomes the central pillar 
of Dezhou’s economy, accounting for 51.6% of Dezhou’s GDP in 2014 (Dezhou 
Statistics Bureau, 2015). Equipment manufacturing, food, chemical, and textile 
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industries are the four competitive industries in Dezhou. Dezhou’s central air-
conditioning industry is of national importance (Dezhou Government, 2006), but is 
dominated by small enterprises without well-known brands and is criticized for being 
highly polluting.  
 
Meanwhile, the solar industry is emerging in Dezhou and has become the most 
frequently promoted city image of Dezhou. Dezhou’s solar industry was born with the 
establishment of Himin. By the early 2000s, Himin quickly developed into the world’s 
largest SWH manufacturer, and the market developed by and technology spillovers 
from Himin stimulated further local entrepreneurship in the solar industry. In 2010, the 
city was home to more than 120 enterprises engaging in solar-related industries, 
achieving more than 50 billion RMB sales revenue. Around 800 thousand people in 
Dezhou were employed in the solar industry, representing one-third of the city’s 
workforce (Tyfield, Jin, & Rooker, 2010). Moreover, the green industry brought with 
Dezhou increasing national and international recognition. In 2005, the city was 
designated as China’s Solar City by China’s Solar Association. In 2009, Dezhou was 
designated as one of China’s first Renewable Energy Demonstration Cities by the 
Department of Housing and Urban-Rural Development. Dezhou boosted its 
international reputation when it hosted the 4th International Solar City Congress in 2010.  
 
The municipal government believed that the solar industry would be promising and 
decided to incorporate solar energy into Dezhou’s future vision. In 2005, Dezhou 
municipal government put forward the Solar City Strategy, aiming to promote solar 
energy as Dezhou’s new leading industry and to build Dezhou as the solar city of China 
and even the world. Apparently, the government shows a high level of economic interest 
in the SWH industry, and the green image is a bonus that can trigger further investment.  
 
4.1.2 Governing practices 
With a strong economic incentive in the SWH industry, Dezhou’s government has 
adopted a comprehensive approach in promoting the industry and SWH diffusion. The 
government has been active in governing by provision. To build a solar city, the 
municipal government and county-level governments together provided more than 80 
million RMB annually for the demonstration projects of solar energy. In 2008, 
Dezhou’s Solar City Office was established to promote the application of solar energy 
in Dezhou and to help solar enterprises extend new technologies with demonstration 
projects (Dezhou Government, 2014). In 2009, Dezhou was awarded the National 
Demonstration City for the Application of Renewable Energy in Buildings and received 
60 million RMB to subsidize more than 60 demonstration projects. Further policy 
packages, such as subsidies for rural residents and land use privileges for SWH firms, 
were introduced to encourage the SWH sector. As a government official put it: 
 10 
…the municipal government was rigorous in approving the land use, (but) 
the government supported solar industry, so when they applied for new 
projects in new development zones, their projects were regarded as key 
projects, and their demand for land use was prioritized. [Interviewee from 
Dezhou government]. 
 
In terms of self-governing, since the early 2000s, Dezhou municipal government has 
been a role-model of SWH use. Dezhou government first experimented with SWH-
building integration in its employees’ residential community before it officially 
encouraged this practice. After Dezhou being awarded as China’s Solar City, the 
municipal government deployed many demonstration projects in municipal buildings 
and urban public facilities such as museums, stadiums, hospitals, and schools. These 
efforts have not only strengthened the image of the solar city but also increased citizens’ 
awareness of solar energy. 
 
As for governing by authority, Dezhou was among the first group of cities that officially 
encouraged the integration of SWH in buildings by issuing the Notice on the 
Comprehensive Application of SWH in Construction Projects in 2005. In 2008, the 
municipal government enacted the mandatory installation policy, explicitly requiring 
new construction projects to integrate SWH in design and construction. Projects that 
fail to comply with the requirement will not be given permission for construction or 
completion inspection. Conversely, projects that meet the requirement will enjoy some 
privileges, such as priority in land use, a simplified approval process, and mitigation in 
building urban supporting facilities. In 2009, Dezhou government developed the 
Dezhou Renewable Energy Application in Construction Special Planning, which 
clearly stated the long-term objectives of the application of renewable energy in the 
construction sector. 
 
In terms of governing by enabling, a Solar City Strategy Committee was established to 
promote and implement the solar city strategy in 2005 (Dezhou Government, 2014). 
Dezhou is the only city in China that has such a specialized institution to promote the 
development of solar energy. Solar thermal energy is not only encouraged in local 
industry policy but also integrated into its local strategic vision to build Dezhou as 
China’s solar city. This strategic vision goes beyond merely giving a clear signal to the 
local community, but has been realized with concrete measures, including hosting the 
World Solar City Congress and promoting and marketing Dezhou as a solar city 
nationally and internationally. Other events such as Solar Expo and Solar Thanksgiving 
Day are held regularly to enhance the communication between Dezhou and foreign 
countries and inspire residents’ enthusiasm for solar energy. A government official 
illustrated the government’s motivation: 
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Dezhou’s government departments that are related to economic 
development…all highly cherish the achievements made by Dezhou’s 
solar industry. We hold the International Solar Expo every two years to 
promote our products on the one hand, and to attract international experts 
to guide our practices on the other. [Interviewee from Dezhou government] 
 
4.2 Rizhao 
4.2.1 Rizhao government’s interest towards SWH 
Rizhao is located on the eastern coast of Shandong Province in China. Leading 
industries in Rizhao are metallurgical industry, motor vehicles and parts, petrochemical 
industry, cereals, oils, and foodstuffs industry, pulp and paper industry, building 
materials industry and textile and garment industry. Together they contribute more than 
80% to the city’s economy. In contrast to these dominant industries, the SWH industry 
has played a relatively minor role in Rizhao’s economy. For example, in the list of key 
government-supported enterprises in 2016, of the 97 above-scale enterprises, there was 
only one SWH manufacturer. This has partially explained the government’s lack of 
economic incentives in supporting the SWH industry, particularly during the early stage 
of development.  
 
In fact, the popularization of evacuated-tube SWHs in Rizhao exhibits significant 
bottom-up diffusion characteristics, driven by unmet social needs for domestic use of 
hot water (Huang, Ma, et al., 2018). It was not until 2004 that the SWH industry started 
to gain attention from the Rizhao government. Early at the beginning of the 21st century, 
the popularization rate of SWH in Rizhao had already reached 70% (Southern Weekly, 
2009). Local residents and enterprises played a leading role in the diffusion process. 
The situation seems to change after Rizhao’s winning of the “World Clean Energy 
Awards” in 2007. With an increasing international reputation in SWH application, this 
UN Award has in a sense given the local government a strong environmental incentive 
in supporting the industry. This environmental incentive is well illustrated in a speech 
given by a governmental official (Rizhao Construction Committee, 2010): 
For many years, Rizhao leads in the application of SWH in buildings 
among Chinese cities, whose achievements have been widely lauded ... 
However, because we do not mandate the installation of SWHs in high-
rise buildings… there is a tendency of decreasing SWH application rate. If 
things continue this way, soon Rizhao will lose its leading position in the 
application of solar thermal technology. 
The government official expressed the government’s concerns on whether Rizhao can 
maintain its leading position in the application of solar thermal technology. This green 
image is also well aligned with Rizhao’s vision to build a coastal tourist city. In recent 
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years, mandatory installation of SWHs in high-rise buildings has helped the opening up 
of a new market segment for flat-plate SWHs and thus the drastic growth of a large 
local flat-plate SWH manufacturer in Rizhao. This has, in a sense, increased the 
economic incentive of the municipal government in supporting SWH application. 
 
Overall, for Rizhao, the government’s interests in supporting SWH application are 
mainly environment-oriented, though also with a certain level of economic interest at 
the later stage.  
 
4.2.2 Governing practices 
Governing by provision, particularly in financial terms, has not been very intensively 
used by the municipal government of Rizhao. This is reasonable considering its 
relatively limited public financial resources as a small city. However, the government 
did engage actively in applying for external subsidies for SWH application provided by 
provincial and national governments. Similar to Dezhou, in 2011, Rizhao was awarded 
the National Demonstration City for the Application of Renewable Energy in Buildings, 
and a total of 60 million RMB subsidies was provided by the national government. 
Although Rizhao spent more than half of the subsidy on the application of SWH in 
buildings, it was far from sufficient. As indicated by a government official: 
The subsidy was given to real estate developers to install SWHs... but it is 
definitely not enough. For every square meter of construction area, they 
get a subsidy of 2 RMB, and for a hundred square meters, there are only 
200 RMB. So the subsidy is more a kind of encouragement. [Interviewee 
from Rizhao government] 
In addition to national funding, the municipal government also actively applied for 
subsidy provided by the Shandong provincial government for the application of SWH 
in public buildings such as schools, hospitals, and geracomiums.  
 
Activities of self-governing and governing through enabling have also been limited in 
Rizhao. Although the government implemented SWH installation in some public 
buildings, these were mainly a part of the demonstration program supported by 
provincial or national governments. Moreover, the government played a limited role in 
coordinating between key actors to facilitate the diffusion of SWHs, and effective 
communication platforms were absent in Rizhao.  
 
Due to the lack of robust economic incentives and limited public financial resources, 
the Rizhao government resorted more to governing by authority. In 2007, after winning 
the UN award, the Rizhao municipal government issued the regulation for the 
 13 
mandatory installation of SWHs in newly-built low-rise and multi-story residential 
buildings. In 2008, Rizhao adopted the new Building Energy Saving Standard of 
Shandong Province, which technologically guaranteed the large-scale implementation 
of SWHs in high-rise buildings. In late 2009, the Shandong provincial government 
introduced the mandatory installation regulation to implement the application of SWHs, 
aiming to increase the application rate of SWHs in urban areas in Shandong province 
from 20% to 40% within the coming three years (Shandong Provincial Government, 
2010). Later in 2010, driven by environmental pressures from higher-level governments 
and also, as aforementioned, to maintain its own SWH application rate, the Rizhao 
government extended the original mandatory regulation from low-rise buildings to 
high-rise buildings. To ensure the enforcement of this regulation, the government did a 
thorough investigation of all the high-rise buildings that had been approved for 
construction. A list of 83 real estate projects was published, and the developers were 
required to revise the construction design to integrate SWHs in buildings.  
4.3 Beijing 
4.3.1 Beijing government’s interest towards SWH 
As China’s capital, Beijing is one of the most developed cities in China. Before the 
mid-1990s, Beijing’s economy was dominated by heavy industries, such as steel, 
petrochemical and automobile industries. In 1997, Beijing’s government carried out the 
Capital Economy Strategy to transform the economy from a manufacturing-dominated 
one to a service-based economy, which grew to represent 76% of the city’s GDP in 
2013 (Beijing Statistics Bureau, 2015). However, the negative legacy of heavy 
industrialization and fast urbanization remains. Beijing is confronted with severe 
environmental problems, with air pollution being the most serious social concern in 
recent years. The Beijing government thus strives to improve the environment by 
increasing the share of clean energy in its energy mix, which was only 1.5% in 2006 
but targeted to be 8.1% by 2020.  
 
The beginning of Beijing’s solar thermal research was in response to the global energy 
crisis in the 1970s. The concentration of national research institutes and universities, as 
well as national support, enabled Beijing’s role as an innovation center of China’s solar 
thermal technology. Beijing accommodates one of the largest SWH clusters in China 
(150 firms in 2010) (Luo, Huo, and Xie, 2013), but the scale of the industry is still 
comparatively small in terms of GDP output. Moreover, the SWH industry is often 
deemed as a low-end industry, which contradicts Beijing’s pursuit for high-end 
industries. This indicates that Beijing lacks economic incentives in promoting the SWH 
industry. It was not until 2012 that the government issued the mandatory installation 
policy as a way to combat air pollution. As observed by an SWH entrepreneur:  
As for the driving force of SWH deployment in Beijing in recent years, the 
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foremost factor is the haze. You can easily feel the seriousness of this 
problem, and then some national policies such as energy-saving and 
emission reduction, and local policies such as Beijing’s clean air plan, 
came into force. [Interviewee from an SWH firm] 
Because of Beijing’s special role as the nation’s capital, the Beijing government 
suffered substantial political pressure from both the central government and the civil 
society in combating air pollution. SWH, though without a high-end profile, is expected 
to play a role in reducing buildings’ energy consumption. Apparently, the support of 
SWH in Beijing is primarily environment-driven, but it seems that the government is 
not so confident that such a simple technology will play a prominent role in addressing 
Beijing’s environmental challenges.   
 
4.3.2 Governing practices 
As for governing by provision, Beijing’s solar thermal energy industry did receive 
government support in technology development in the early phases. For instance, since 
the 1980s, the central government and the Beijing government have granted many key 
research projects in solar thermal technologies. Nevertheless, this support mainly went 
to universities and research institutes, and private enterprises did not receive much 
incentive from the government. It should be noted that much of Beijing’s research 
funding on solar thermal energy was actually assigned by the national government, 
rather than by the Beijing municipal government. Considering this, the Beijing 
municipal government’s role in governing by provision is even smaller. 
 
The Beijing municipal government has also shown some activities of self-governing 
concerning SWH application. However, demonstration projects were somewhat 
constrained to several dispersed sites, such as public sports facilities for the Olympic 
Games. In terms of governing by enabling, Beijing has seemed merely to give the signal 
to encourage the use of solar thermal energy through its Five-Year Plan. The municipal 
government also helped mobilize financial resources to state-owned SWH enterprises. 
For instance, in 2002, when Beijing started to promote green development and Capital 
Steel, a large state-owned steel enterprise, was about to move out Beijing, the political 
leaders of Beijing built a bridge between Capital Steel and green firms. One of the 
actions was that Capital Steel invested 100 million RMB to an SWH firm, Tsinghua 
Solar. However, this is not a common practice and is limited to a few state-owned 
enterprises. 
 
Governing by authority has played a vital role in Beijing’s case when compared to other 
modes. Building standards and mandatory SWH installation regulations are the most 
prominent approaches in this mode of governance. Beijing’s building standards place 
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more emphasis on reaching a certain level of energy efficiency, which is among the 
highest in China. This energy efficiency performance can be achieved mainly through 
insulation technologies, and the use of renewable energy only plays a minimal role. 
These standards, to a certain extent, promoted the SWH installation, but they are not as 
specific and clear as Dezhou’s building standards that explicitly require to reserve 
installation space for SWHs. While many cities had implemented mandatory policies 
earlier, Beijing was much more cautious in carrying out mandatory policies. Beijing’s 
SWH industry had started lobbying the government for a mandatory installation policy 
since 2005, but only after 2012, when air pollution became so severe, that the 
government decided to adopt the policy, with adaptions to Beijing’s context. For 
instance, Beijing required that the complementary energy for solar water systems 
should be gas, rather than electricity. This was believed to have better performance in 
energy saving. Besides, for high-rise buildings, it was not required to use SWH to cover 
all the households in the building, but at least, a certain portion of the building should 
have access to SWH.  
 
However, the policy was not well implemented. SWH-integrated building projects did 
witness an apparent increase since 2012, but the majority of the installation was in 
government-led projects such as public rental housing. The core problem was that an 
inspection system of SWH incorporation was not well established, so estate developers 
only used inferior SWH to cope with the regulation. This, in turn, led to a lack of trust 
in the quality of SWH products among users. The mandatory policy is now nearly 
paused in Beijing.    
  
4.4 Shenzhen 
4.4.1 Shenzhen government’s interest towards SWH 
Shenzhen is a city in Guangdong province, immediately adjacent to Hongkong. In 1979, 
it was designated as a protected economic zone, and ever since the city has had 
unprecedented rapid urban development. In 2016, Shenzhen’s GDP ranked fourth in 
China. Shenzhen has four pillar industries, namely, cultural and creative industry, high-
tech industry, modern logistics industry, and financial industry. Unlike Dezhou or 
Beijing, a cluster of SWH industry has not been formed in Shenzhen. After years of 
industrial upgrading, Shenzhen’s economic priority has been oriented towards the 
development of high-value-added, high-tech, and high-end industries. The SWH 
technology, with relatively limited added-value, is not a focus of development. This is 
similar to the situation in Beijing. From an economic perspective, Shenzhen lacks 
strong incentives in implementing SWH application.  
 
However, Shenzhen does possess significant environmental incentives in applying 
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environmentally friendly and energy-efficient technologies, including SWH. Although 
Shenzhen has become one of the four first-tier cities in China, as a very young city, it 
is eager to establish its own identity. Beside ‘city of innovation’, ‘livable city’ is another 
notable label that has been propagated by the municipal government. Shenzhen’s air 
quality is the best among the four first-tier cities. To maintain its identity as a livable 
city, Shenzhen has been very active in the utilization of low-carbon technologies in 
different sectors, including the transportation sector (new energy vehicles) and the 
building sector (green buildings). Therefore, the Shenzhen government’s interests in 
supporting SWH application are mainly environment-driven.  
 
4.4.2 Governing practices 
Shenzhen is a city with strong governance capacities. Governing by provision has been 
very frequently applied by Shenzhen municipal government. In 2009, Shenzhen was 
among the first to be designated as the Demonstration City for the Implementation of 
Renewable Energy Buildings, under which the Solar Rooftop Project was launched in 
2010 (GOSMPG, 2010). For this two-year (2010-2011) demonstration program, 
Shenzhen received 80 million RMB of national subsidy, of which 70 million was used 
to support SWH installation. Besides, the municipal government allocated 120 million 
RMB as special funding for the application of renewable energy in buildings, of which 
105 million was spent on SWH (GOSMPG, 2010). The frequent use of economic 
governance instruments has been supported by Shenzhen’s strong financial capacity. 
     
Self-governing has been demonstrated through the prioritizing of the installation of 
SWH in public buildings. Many public hospitals and universities in Shenzhen installed 
SWHs. In particular, the SWH system installed in the Universiade Athletes’ Village was 
one of the biggest SWH systems in China. Another typical project was the Shenzhen 
Universiade Sports Centre. This project applied different renewable technologies. 
These projects were expected to have a demonstration effect on the public.    
 
The Shenzhen government has also conducted many activities through governing by 
enabling. In Shenzhen’s 12th Five-Year Plan, specific goals were set up for the 
application of SWH in buildings. SWH technology was also emphasized in Shenzhen’s 
12th Five-Year Plan for the Application of Renewable Energy in Buildings and the 12th 
Five-Year Plan for Building Energy-saving and Green Buildings. The Shenzhen Solar 
Energy Society was established in 2006, the primary mission of which was to bring 
together different stakeholders to implement SWH technology and industry. Besides, 
the municipal government also frequently organized conferences and training 
workshops (HCBSM, 2013).  
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Similar to other cities, governing by authority has been primarily represented by the 
mandatory installation regulation of SWHs. As early as 2006, Shenzhen was designated 
as the Demonstration City for the Scaling-up of Renewable Energy (Solar Energy) 
Buildings. In the same year, Shenzhen enacted the first mandatory installation 
regulation of SWH in residential buildings of 12 floors or below. After Shenzhen’s 
designation as the Demonstration City for the Implementation of Renewable Energy 
Buildings in 2009, the municipal government launched the Solar Rooftop Project, 
extending the mandatory installation regulation from buildings of 12 floor or below to 
high-rise buildings (GOSMPG, 2010). As the demonstration city for renewable energy 
buildings, specific and strict requirements were set by the central government, such as 
to achieve a total application area of 7.12 million m2 within two years (2010 to 2011). 
Compared to commercial housing, the mandatory SWH installation seemed to be more 
strictly and vigorously enforced in social housing projects in Shenzhen. In 2010, a 
notice on energy efficiency in public housing was published by the municipal 
government, in which it required the installation of SWHs in all newly-built public 
housing in Shenzhen (HCBSM, 2010). Around 52,300 affordable apartments built in 
2010 were all equipped with SWHs.  
 
Overall, a combination of different governance approaches has been used in SWH 
application in Shenzhen. However, in 2014, Shenzhen was the first city in China that 
officially abolished the mandatory SWH installation policy. Similar to Beijing’s 
situation, a mismatch between technological characteristics and local contextual factors 
have resulted in the failure of SWH implementation in Shenzhen (Huang, Broto, Liu, 
& Ma, 2018; Yu & Gibbs, 2018a). Particularly, local residents’ social practices have 
formed around gas and electric water heaters, and they have much less tolerance to the 
unreliability of SWHs. 
5 Discussion  
An illustrative overview of the evolving dynamics of the government’s incentive mode 
of the four cities is presented in figure 2. Dezhou government was mainly motivated by 
the economic interest at the early stage, but it also developed an environmental interest 
as the city gained more national and international green reputations, which in turn 
helped to mobilize more global investment to Dezhou’s SWH industry. In recent years, 
as the SWH industry suffered from stagnation in the retail market and with the rise of 
other industries, the role of SWH in Dezhou’s economy is declining. Even so, Dezhou 
government still shows an economy-environment overlap incentive model to the SWH 
industry. The municipal governments of Rizhao, Beijing, and Shenzhen all lack 
significant economic incentives in supporting the SWH industry. In the case of Rizhao, 
although initially the municipal government was mainly motivated by environmental 
incentives, a certain level of economic incentive has managed to develop. On the one 
hand, the mandatory application of SWHs in high-rise buildings has fuelled the rise of 
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a local flat-plate SWH industry; and on the other hand, national and international 
recognition of the city’s green development has helped the thriving of the tourism 
industry.  
 
Figure 2. Dynamics of the four governments’ incentive mode on SWH  
 
In contrast, the government’s incentives of SWH implementation in both Beijing and 
Shenzhen have followed a trajectory from the environment-driven mode to the status 
quo. The two municipal governments were mainly motivated by the environmental 
interest when deciding to support SWH installation, but apparently, the Shenzhen 
government had a more proactive attitude towards the technology at first while the 
Beijing government was much less decisive from the very beginning. It seems the 
Beijing government had little confidence in SWH’s technical performance, and thus 
only passively responded to the central government’s and the public’s environmental 
expectation by issuing a mandatory installation policy, which currently almost exists 
only in name because of the absence of an effective inspection system. While in 
Shenzhen, the municipal government modified its position in SWH implementation 
from mandating to encouraging. As the market was damaged by inferior projects, both 
municipal governments lost faith in the SWH technology and chose to turn to other 
low-carbon technologies to fulfill similar environmental commitments. 
 
Therefore, local governments’ incentive in low-carbon innovations is contingent to not 
only the characteristics of the focal technology but also the city’s specific territorial 
contexts. As mentioned, SWH is generally recognized as a low-end and low-tech 
industry with low added-value. Compared to other technologies such as solar PV, the 
relatively low economic output of the SWH industry provides little economic incentive 
to local governments. In Dezhou, the presence of the leading enterprise Himin has 
played a significant and unique role in incentivizing the local government’s support for 
Rizhao  
Dezhou  
Economic  
interest  
Environmental interest  
Shenzhen 
Beijing   
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the SWH industry. However, this can hardly be the case for other cities, especially for 
the more developed cities such as Beijing and Shenzhen. Moreover, China’s political 
and economic context exerts different pressures on cities at different development 
stages. For forerunners of economic development, they suffer more pressure on the 
transformation of industrial structure and have a higher imperative to green the 
economy, while latecomers still view economic development as the first priority. When 
cities reach more advanced development phases, economic incentives go beyond the 
sole calculation of the contributions to GDP but embrace more nuanced meanings. For 
cities like Beijing and Shenzhen, the central priority is economic restructuring. Under 
this rationale, high-tech industries are prioritized over low-tech ones.  
 
Incentive typologies affect governing performance (Table 2). It is no surprise to see that 
the four governments were most active in the approach of governing by authority, as all 
the four cities have an environmental incentive but the market lacks inherent incentive 
to incorporate SWHs into buildings. In governing by authority, regulatory instruments 
were most frequently adopted. As noted by Borrás and Edquist (2013), regulatory 
instruments are obligatory in nature. They are deeply rooted in the normative authority 
of governments. Obligatory regulations define rules of innovation processes and 
activities and help the nurturing of a niche market, one typical example of which is the 
mandatory installation policy. Other than that, Rizhao and Beijing were not active in 
other governing approaches. Although both Dezhou and Shenzhen demonstrated a more 
comprehensive governing mode, Dezhou’s supporting measures were more substantial 
and lasted for a more extended period. Specifically, Dezhou municipal government 
applied different types of policy instruments to promote the uptake of SWH. For 
instance, various government-subsidized demonstration projects represented economic 
instruments for technology push. Different from Dezhou, Shenzhen eventually lost its 
faith in SWH and canceled the mandatory installation policy. 
 
Table 2. Performance in each governance mode  
 Dezhou   Rizhao  Beijing  Shenzhen 
Self-governing ***** * * *** 
Governing by authority ***** **** *** *** 
Governing by provision  ***** ** * **** 
Governing through 
enabling  
***** * * *** 
 
The performance of governance approaches pertains to governments’ incentive 
typologies. In promoting low-carbon innovations, governments only motivated by 
environmental incentives may not adopt genuine governing approaches, while those 
motivated by economic interests would resort to more substantial supporting measures. 
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A key issue at stake here is whether the government’s motivations are endogenous or 
exogenous. In many cases, environmental interest is merely a passive political response 
to pressures from higher-level governments or the public and is thus exogenous. Under 
China’s current discursive landscape, environmental issues are still viewed as less 
important than issues such as education, employment, and healthcare among urban 
middle-class (Li & Tilt, 2017). Besides, environmental performance, unlike economic 
performance, is challenging to evaluate in the short term as it often involves trans-
territory coordination. For local governments, environmental achievements to some 
extent are more like fancy clothes, which often only please others but wear 
uncomfortable. It is particularly true when facing low-end low-carbon innovations, 
whose technical performance and environmental benefits remain uncertain. 
 
In contrast, the economic incentive is apparently far more endogenous as it not only 
meets the GDP-oriented cadre performance evaluation system but also brings local 
governments with a stronger financial capacity to govern many public issues. In 
practice, to what extent an industry receives official support often has much to do with 
its role in the local economy (Zhu & He, 2015). Surely, governing approaches are also 
conditioned by local governments’ resources (e.g., fiscal volume) and capacities 
(supervision of policy implementation and knowledge). However, in Dezhou’s case, we 
see how a strong endogenous (economic) incentive has mobilized a wide variety of 
governmental resources, even when the Dezhou government has relatively limited 
governance capacities compared to that of Beijing and Shenzhen. This indicates that 
green activities could also be favored in latecomer cities if they are well aligned with 
local economic development. 
6 Conclusion   
An open-ended and uncertain process of urban sustainability transitions that is 
underway has posed new challenges to urban governance (Frantzeskaki et al., 2012). 
Local governments that exhibit different patterns in the choice of governing strategies 
are often motivated by different interests in the focal low-carbon innovations. Previous 
studies on the incentives of local governments have been too general and have failed to 
account for the particularity of specific technologies. This paper contributes to the 
literature by identifying a more industry-specific incentive model of local government. 
We find that, under the Chinese context, the government’s incentive towards a 
particular low-carbon innovation largely depends on the technology’s economic value 
and environmental value, as well as whether they match local development priorities.  
 
Another contribution of this research is to link local governments’ industry-specific 
incentives with their governing practices. Previous studies find that local governments 
are both the agent of higher-level government and representatives of local interest, and 
this dual identity largely affects their governing practices (Zhao et al., 2013). This study 
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goes one step further to investigate how this dual identity is played in local governments’ 
governing practices towards a specific low-carbon innovation. Compared to the 
environmental incentive, the economic interest seems to be a more endogenous 
incentive for local governments. Even though the global and national policy narratives 
are imposing greater pressure/ incentive to local governments in green transitions, 
environmental incentive alone is still not effective enough to motivate local 
governments to invest in low-carbon innovations genuinely. In contrast, if sufficient 
economic incentives are provided, local governments are more likely to deliver long-
term commitments and to adopt comprehensive governing approaches to support low-
carbon innovations.  
 
The research findings offer important implications for urban governance for low-carbon 
transitions, particularly for latecomer cities where economic development still 
outweighs environmental issues. Both local contexts and technology characteristics 
condition whether alignment could be reached between the focal low-carbon 
innovations and local economic development priorities. It is therefore crucial that low-
carbon governance is sensitive to local socio-economic contexts and aims to seek 
common ground between both environmental and economic objectives. 
 
This study proposes two avenues for future research. First, this study is situated within 
the Chinese context, and drivers of low-carbon policy could be very different in other 
countries’ contexts. Considering that local governments’ incentives are significantly 
shaped by a country’s political regime, other potential incentives for low-carbon 
innovations (e.g., energy cost and pressure from civil society) can be explored through 
comparative studies of different political systems. Apparently, the role of citizens is 
currently less presented in China’s low-carbon policy-making process, but it could be 
a very different story in western countries where citizens have more power of discourse 
and higher environmental awareness. Second, this study has captured the relevance of 
both technology features and a city’s place-based contexts in shaping local governments’ 
incentives. In particular, we see great potential in latecomer cities in developing both 
economic and environmental incentives towards low-carbon innovations, since 
economic growth is usually their development priority and environmental achievement 
could further legitimize their economic development, leading to a virtuous cycle (Yu & 
Gibbs, 2018c). Future research could explore the co-evolution pattern of economic and 
environmental incentives by comparing local governments’ incentives towards low-
carbon innovations for cities at different development stages.   
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